




















































































































































































































































It has long been recognized that increases in technical eﬃciency play a critical role in long-
term growth. For high-income countries this has led researchers to focus attention on the R&D
process. For low-income countries ￿ which are presumed to operate inside the technological
frontier ￿ an additional source of eﬃciency gains is to be found in the adoption of technologies
already developed in technologically advanced countries.1 Yet not much is known empirically
on the determinants of technology adoption. This paper presents a case study of the diﬀusion
of computer technology around the World. In particular, it tries to identify variables that
predict adoption of computers in a panel of countries.
Computers make for an ideal case study of technology diﬀusion. First, they have
been introduced recently, i.e. after or in conjunction with the inception of the relevant data
collection processes. This allows us to catch the process from its very beginning. Second,
computers constitute a clear case of embodied technology: a country cannot adopt computer
technology without physically installing computers. Hence, a measure of the computing
capacity installed is a direct measure of technology adoption. In contrast, it is very hard to
measure the diﬀusion of technologies that are disembodied.
Of course direct measures of investment in computing equipment do not exist for
large enough a number of countries and long enough a time span.2 However, we argue
that measures of imports of computing equipment are likely to be adequate proxies of such
investments. This is because most countries in the World simply do not have a computer-
making industry ￿ and this was especially true at the beginning of the diﬀusion stage. For
these countries, the capacity installed is the capacity imported. In other words, technology
diﬀusion takes place through imports of the equipment embodying the technology.
We have detailed data on imports of computer equipment for virtually all countries
in the World, starting in 1970. Hence, this paper will use panel data to seek to empirically
characterize the determinants of imports of computers across countries. Our strongest ￿nd-
ings are that computer adoption is associated with high levels of human capital, and with
manufacturing trade openness vis-a-vis the OECD. We also ￿nd considerable evidence that
computer adoption is enhanced by good property rights protection, high rates of investment
per worker, and a small share of agriculture in GDP. There is also some evidence for a nega-
tive role of the size of government, and a positive role of the share of manufacturing in GDP.
1Macroeconomic evidence that poor countries operate inside the technology frontier can be found in (among
others) Francesco Caselli, Gerardo Esquivel and Fernando Lefort (1996), Peter Klenow and Andres Rodriguez-
Clare (1997), Robert Hall and Charles Jones (1999), and Caselli and John Coleman (2000).
2The UNDP has a data set with stock of personal computer for the 1990s. Jong-Wha Lee (2001) has
examined these data and ￿consistent with our results ￿ has found a strong role for human capital.
1After controlling for the above-mentioned variables, we do not ￿nd an independent role for
the English- (or European-) language skills of the population. The quantitative importance
of these ￿ndings, as well as their theoretical interpretation, is discussed in the concluding
section.
2 Data on Computer Imports
The focus of our analysis is computer investment per worker. We measure aggregate com-
puter investment by imports of computer equipment. Almost all countries in the World
report detailed information on their bilateral trade ￿ows by very disaggregated product or
commodity to the United Nations. These detailed trade ￿ow data have been made available
by Robert Feenstra, Robert Lipsey, and Harry Bowen (1997). This paper focuses on imports
of automatic data processing machines and units thereof; magnetic and optical readers, ma-
chines for transcribing data onto data media in coded form and machines for processing such
data, n.e.s.. In practice, this variable measures imports of assembled computers, as well as
imports of key components, such as central processing units, memory chips, storage devices,
and peripherals.3 We focus on the period 1970-1990, which essentially covers the beginning
and the coming of age of the computer revolution. Information on computer imports is avail-
able on 155 countries, though the country coverage for most of our empirical work will shrink
because of limitations in the covariates we use. We express the import data in per-worker
terms by dividing aggregate computer imports by the labor force, as measured by the World
Bank (1999).
We believe computer imports per worker to be an adequate measure of computer
investment per worker for a large majority of the countries in the World. Simply put, the
computer industry is well known to be highly concentrated internationally, with a handful of
countries providing most of the World￿s computer output. For this reason, computer imports
and computer investment are probably very closely associated. A check of this idea based
on computer exports per worker gives a somewhat ambiguous response. The percentage of
countries in the sample with no reported computer exports falls from 58% in 1970 to 13%
in 1990. Hence, a sizeable fraction of the sample appear to be exporting some computers ￿
perhaps suggesting the existence of a domestic computer industry, after all ￿ especially in the
3The computer-import variable is category 752 in the UN data set. It includes the following sub-categories
(for which separate data is available): Analogue and hybrid (analogue/digital) data processing machines
(7521); Complete digital data processing machines, comprising in the same housing the central processing
unit and at least one input unit and one output unit (7522); Complete digital central processing units; digital
processors consisting of arithmetical, logical, and control elements (7523); Digital central (main) storage
units, separately consigned (7524); Peripheral units, including control and adapting units (connected directly
or indirectly to the central unit) (7525); and Oﬀ-line data processing equipment, n.e.s. (7528).
2later period of coverage. However, inspection of the data reveals that most of the positives
are trivial in amount ￿ suggesting to us that almost certainly these exports re￿ect re-exports
or statistical anomalies.
In order to deal with the ambiguous message from the export data, in our empirical
work we work with three data sets of computer adoption. The ￿rst data set proxies computer
adoption with computer imports and uses the full sample. The second uses the same adoption
variable, but limits the sample to those countries with no reported computer exports. This
is clearly overkill, as it excludes some countries that cannot be plausibly deemed to produce
their computers domestically. But any alternative cut-oﬀ criteria would be arbitrary, and this
stringent criterion allows us to check the robustness of the results from the full sample.4 The
third data set uses production data from UNIDO (2000) to construct an adoption variable
based on the formula: adoption = production+imports-exports. One shortcoming of this
(otherwise ideal) adoption variable is that the production data pertain to a somewhat broader
category of equipment, namely Oﬃce, Computing, and Accounting Machinery (OCAM), so
its identi￿cation with computer adoption is not as tight.5 More distressingly, the country
coverage is quite limited. Furthermore, time coverage for these data for a reasonable number
of countries only starts in the 1980s. The important point, however, is that, as it will be
seen, some key results are fairly similar in the three samples.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of computer imports per worker in selected years
for the three samples. The table attests to the very large diﬀerences across countries within
each period. Most variables are reported in current-dollar levels, and should therefore not
be used for intertemporal comparisons. The only exception is the log-variance, which should
be roughly unit-free, and is perhaps suggestive of some reduction in dispersion over time
￿ perhaps a sign that Mr. Clinton￿s ￿digital divide￿ may be shrinking (at least among
countries). To provide an additional preliminary look at the data, Figure 1 plots the log of
computer imports per worker against the log of per capita income (from Heston and Summers,
1994) in selected years. In this ￿gure each country￿s position is marked by its three-digit
World Bank code name. Lowercase letters identify countries with positive reported exports
of computers. Uppercase letters identify countries with no reported computer exports (i.e.
our Non-Exporting Sample). Not all countries in the ￿gure report data on the covariates we
will use in the empirical work. A list of countries included in the regressions is reported in
4One problem with the import data is that they are not f.o.b., i.e. the values re￿ect in part insurance and
freight. However, neither are they c.i.f. In practice, the reported values are somewhere between f.o.b. and
c.i.f. See Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997). It is not clear at this stage how to ￿x this problem.
5The OCAM production variable is category 3825 in the UNIDO (2000) dataset, which adopts an ISIC
classi￿cation. Information provided by UNIDO itself allows to determine that concordance with the trade
data requires to aggregate categories 751 (Oﬃce Machines), 752 (our computer variable), and 759 (parts for
751 and 752) in the latter.
3the Appendix, together with their World Bank codes and the raw computer-import data.
Table 1: Computer Imports: Summary Statistics
Mean Log Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. No. of Obs.
Full Sample
1970 0.784 2.458 0 0.106 8.286 119
1975 3.432 2.698 0 0.539 29.492 120
1980 14.006 2.463 0 1.792 126.216 133
1985 26.749 2.328 0 2.532 277.624 133
1990 60.463 2.313 0.008 5.424 1132.616 133
Non-Exporting Sample
1970 0.203 2.093 0 0.035 4.081 69
1975 0.764 2.663 0 0.158 5.156 56
1980 2.983 2.178 0 0.456 25.1146 2
1985 4.737 1.630 0.029 0.766 129.283 41
1990 4.268 1.876 0.065 1.894 22.750 17
OCAM Sample
1985 76.928 2.226 -478.247 19.339 471.338 38
1990 216.862 2.161 -22.818 34.607 1108.104 41
Note: Computer imports per worker in current US dollars.
In using the current US-dollar value of computer-imports to compare computer adop-
tion across countries at a given point in time we are implicitly assuming that computer prices
obey purchasing power parity. Given the absolute absence of computer-price indices for all
but a few countries we frankly admit we have no way of backing up this assumption. Even
for the USA, the existing de￿ators are surrounded by considerable controversy, and diﬀerent
de￿ators behave wildly diﬀerently. For these reasons, in this paper we eschew inter-temporal
comparisons: all our empirical work will handle intertemporal variation through time dum-
mies which ￿ assuming again that the law of one price holds ￿ should absorb changes in the
dollar price of computing power. We leave the study of intertemporal patterns of computer
adoption to future work.
43 The Determinants of Diﬀusion
Our strategy to investigate the determinants of diﬀerences in computer-technology adoption
is to look at a variety of regression results using speci￿cations of the form
log(Iit
c )=α + δtβ + Xitγ + ηi + uit (1)
where Iit
c is computer imports per worker (in current US dollars) in country i and year t,
Xit is a set of explanatory variables, δt is a set of year dummies, ηi is a country eﬀect, and
uit is independently and identically distributed among countries and years. All the variables
we will include in the vector X are available at annual frequency, except for our measure of
human capital, which is only available at 5-year intervals. Since this variable turns out to
be a key determinant of computer adoption, our regressions are based on data for the years
1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. Depending on the sample, the country coverage varies
roughly between 40 and 90.6
In cross-country studies of this kind there is considerable controversy regarding the
appropriate estimation technique, and in particular regarding the treatment of the country-
speci￿ct e r m ,ηi. The basic choice is between random eﬀects (RE) and ￿xed eﬀects (FE). The
RE estimator is the most eﬃcient but is consistent under the most stringent assumptions, i.e.
that ηi is uncorrelated with the vector Xit. The FE estimator does not require this stringent
a s s u m p t i o n ,b u tt h ec o u n t r yd u m m i e sa b s o r bal o to ft h ev a r i a t i o ni nt h ed a t a ,m a k i n g
the estimator relatively ineﬃcient. Our compromise solution in this ￿eﬃciency-consistency￿
trade oﬀ is to do a bit of both: we include a full set of regional dummies (￿x e dr e g i o ne ﬀects)
and treat the residual country eﬀect as random (random country eﬀect). In other words, we
do assume that ηi is uncorrelated with Xit, but we include in the latter a full set of regional
dummies. This technique is consistent if the part of the country eﬀect that is orthogonal to
the region eﬀe c ti sa l s oo r t h o g o n a lt ot h er e m a i n i n ge l e m e n t so fXit. The advantage is that
it is more eﬃcient than the ￿￿xed country eﬀect￿ estimator. It is important to acknowledge,
however, that when we apply the ￿xed country eﬀect technique to the speci￿cation below we
can identify virtually no signi￿cant explanatory variable.7
We treat the vector Xit as exogenous for log(Iit). Reverse causation is extremely
unlikely to be a problem. For almost all countries in our samples computer adoption is
6In view of the fact that several countries report 0 imports of computers the log speci￿cation may seem to
generate sample selection. It turns out, however, that none of the country-year observations with 0 computer
imports has complete data on the set of explanatory variables we employ, so taking logs per se does not induce
any additional censoring.
7The regional dummies are for: Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin America and Caribbean; Eastern Europe; Arab
World; East Asia; Rest of Asia. In practice, the ￿omitted￿ region coincides almost perfectly with the OECD.
See the appendix for more details on country-year coverage and regional assignments.
5extremely limited between 1970 and 1990, and it is unlikely to have caused changes in any
of the macroeconomic variables on the right hand side. For example, it is highly unrealistic
that computer adoption may have impacted the supply of human capital in countries other
than the most advanced ￿ and even there it is doubtful, before 1990. That reverse causation
is not a major concern does not of course rule out the possibility that we have induced bias
in our estimates by omitting some important explanatory variable.
W es t a r tw i t hr e g r e s s i o n so nt h ef u l ls a m p l eo fc o u n t r i e s .W et h e nr e s t r i c to u r s e l v e s
to the sub-sample with no reported computer exports. Finally, we check the robustness of
our results on the OCAM Sample. Similarly, we start with a pooled (panel) speci￿cation,
but we later present regressions run separately for the diﬀerent years.
One word on our expositional strategy. In order to avoid repetitions, in documenting
our results we proceed briskly and with a bare minimum of commentary. All matters of
interpretation and relevance are deferred to the next (and concluding) section.
3.1 Full Sample
Table (2) reports the results from the all-country, all-year sample. The speci￿cation in
Column I includes the basic set of explanatory variables that will be considered in this
study: the log of real per-capita income; the log of real investment per worker; the share of
agriculture in GDP; the share of manufacturing in GDP; the share of government spending in
GDP; the extent of property-rights protection, as measured by an index ￿ ranging from 1 to
10 ￿ based on international surveys; the share of the population who speak English; human
capital, as measured by the fraction of the labor force (over 15 years of age) who has at least
a completed primary education; trade openness, as measured by the log of total imports per
worker. Further details on these and the other data used in the paper are provided in the
Appendix, which also lists the sources.8 To conserve space, in the Tables we do not report
the coeﬃcients on the 5 year dummies and on the regional dummies. About the former we
just note that they are as expected highly signi￿cant and growing very rapidly. On the latter
we brie￿y report below.
In Column I the variables that have a statistically signi￿cant eﬀect on computer
adoption are per capita income (at the 10% level), investment per worker, the share of
agriculture, human capital, and trade openness. Dropping the insigni￿cant variables one at
a time does not make any of the others become signi￿cant.
In Column II we further investigate the role of human capital by breaking this variable
up into the share of the labor force who has attained primary schooling but went no further
8In the Appendix the reader can also ￿nd a Table of univariate regressions of the dependent variable on
each of the explanatory variables used in this study, one at a time.
6(including those who attended without completing it), the share who has attained secondary
schooling (and went no further), and the share who has attained higher education (the latter
two groups form the composite human-capital variable used in the previous speci￿cations).
Hence, the omitted group is the completely uneducated. The point estimates increase sharply
from primary to secondary education, but level oﬀ (in fact, slightly drop) from secondary
to higher education. Only the coeﬃcient on the fraction attaining secondary education is
signi￿cantly diﬀerent from 0.9,10
We next further investigate the role of openness. In Column III we break down total
import per worker by the identity of the trading partner ￿ OECD vs non-OECD ￿ and by
the nature of the traded good ￿ manufacturing goods versus non-manufacturing goods.11
The result is that both origin and nature of the trade ￿ows matter: only manufacturing
imports from the OECD help predict computer adoption. We have subjected this result to
a battery of checks by including alternative openness-related variables, such as (bilateral-
trade weighted) distance from the leading World exporters, measures of FDI in￿ows, the
black market premium, and the Sachs-Warner openness measure. None of these entered
signi￿cantly in our regressions nor did its inclusion aﬀect the signi￿cance of other variables.
We next investigated a separate role for exports. When we include (the log of) total
exports per worker we obtain a signi￿cantly (at the 10% level) positive coeﬃcient on this
variable, and no substantive change in the coeﬃcients or signi￿cance of other variables (Col-
u m nI V ) .W h e nw ef u r t h e rb r e a kd o w ne x p o r t sb yn a t u r ea n dd e s t i n a t i o nt h es i g n i ￿cant (at
the 10% level) components are manufacturing exports to the OECD and non-manufacturing
exports to non-OECD countries (Column V). In this last speci￿cation the negative coeﬃcient
on non-manufacturing imports from non-OECD countries becomes statistically signi￿cant (at
the 10% level) and the signi￿cance of the coeﬃcient on investment changes from the 5% to
10% level.
3.2 Non-Exporting Sample
The Full Sample we have analyzed so far undoubtedly includes some countries that are
producers of computing equipment. For these countries, computer imports may not be an
9We also further broke down the labor force into ￿ner education categories: primary school completed;
secondary school attained but not completed; secondary school completed; higher education attained but not
completed; higher education completed. There seems to be a broad monotonicity in the coeﬃcients, although
there is a sharp and puzzling drop from higher education achieved to higher education completed. Only the
coeﬃcients on secondary and higher education attained are statistically signi￿cantly diﬀerent from 0.
10All the results are also essentially insensitive to looking at the corresponding shares for the labor force
over 25 (instead of 25).
11More accurately, we treat as OECD members those countries that were members as of 1990 (this excludes
Korea, Mexico, and the Eastern European members). We further exclude Turkey and include Israel.
7adequate measure of computer adoption. In this subsection we examine a sub-sample of
countries that report no computer exports whatsoever. We are virtually certain that these
countries have no computer industry, so for this sub-sample the identi￿cation of computer
imports with computer adoption should be very tight.
O u ra p p r o a c hi st or u nt h es a m ee x a c ts e to fr e g r e s s i o n so nt h es u b - s a m p l ea sw ed i do n
the full sample. The results are reported in Table (3). The results are consistent with those of
the full sample as regards investment per worker; human capital; and manufacturing imports
from OECD countries. But they diﬀer in the following respects: per-capita income, the
share of agriculture, and any export variable are no longer signi￿cant predictors of computer
adoption; the property rights variable takes on a signi￿cantly positive value in some (but
n o ta l l )s p e c i ￿cations; and, somewhat puzzlingly, imports of manufacturing from non-OECD
countries are a signi￿cantly negative predictor of computer adoption (at the 10% level).
3.3 OCAM Sample
The Full Sample has ample country coverage, but underestimates computer adoption for those
countries that have a substantial computer industry. The Non-Exporting Sample represents
a radical but somewhat extreme solution to this problem. In this subsection we pursue an
alternative solution, which is to focus on countries for which we have production data, so
we can appropriately measure adoption as production plus net imports (i.e. imports minus
exports). As discussed above, the price is a small country and time coverage (essentially
only 1985 and 1990), as well as a less tight correspondence between the dependent variable
￿ which now is OCAM ￿ and the phenomenon we wish to explain. As for the Non-exporting
Sample our strategy is to repeat the exact same battery of speci￿cations. The results are
reported in Table 4.
As in the Full Sample and in the Non-Exporting Sample, in the OCAM Sample human
capital and manufacturing imports from the OECD are signi￿cantly positive predictors of
computer adoption, though in the breakdown of the labor force by ￿ner education groups the
OCAM Sample attributes a much larger premium to higher education. The OCAM Sample
agrees with the Full Sample (but disagrees with the Non-Exporting Sample) in identifying the
share of agriculture as a negative predictor of computer adoption, and in not attributing any
role to manufacturing imports from non-OECD countries. It agrees with the Non-Exporting
Sample (and disagrees with the Full Sample) in assigning no predictive power to per-capita
income, and ￿ in the speci￿cations with no export variables ￿ in assigning a strong positive role
to the protection of property rights. It diﬀers from both in that investment per worker is not
signi￿cant in the OCAM Sample, the share of manufacturing becomes signi￿cantly positive
(from insigni￿cant), and the share of government spending in GDP becomes signi￿cantly
8negative (from insigni￿cant) ￿ again in speci￿cations not involving export variables.
3.4 Regressions by Year
Table (5) reports regression results separately for each of the years for which the human
capital information can be constructed. The sample size becomes extremely small, especially
for the early years (the binding constraint is the property rights indicator). Hence, we limit
ourselves to reporting results including the Full Sample of countries. We also limit ourselves
to reporting a somewhat parsimonious version of the speci￿cations in the previous tables. Not
surprisingly, the greatly diminished sample sizes make it diﬃcult to identify the coeﬃcients.
The signs tend to be consistent with those from the pooled samples. Of the variables that
h a db e e ns i g n i ￿cant in at least some of the pooled speci￿cations only investment does not
attain statistical signi￿cance in at least one year.
3.5 Regional Dummies
To conserve space we have not included in the foregoing tables the coeﬃcients on the re-
gional dummy variables. Yet such coeﬃcients are of some interest in themselves, and in
this sub-section we brie￿y report on their sizes and signi￿cance. The East Asian dummy is
insigni￿cant in the Full Sample and in the Non-Exporting Sample; it is strongly signi￿cantly
negative in the OCAM Sample, with a coeﬃcient of about -1,a sw e l la si nt h e1990 regression
(coeﬃcient -0.5); but it is also signi￿cantly positive (coeﬃc i e n t0 . 6 )i nt h e1985 regression
(and insigni￿cant in the other regressions by year). The Latin American dummy tends to be
signi￿cantly negative in the Full Sample (about -0.4) in the OCAM Sample (between -0.5 and
- 0 . 7 ) ,a n di nt h e1990 regression (-0.4); but signi￿cantly positive in Column V for the Non-
Exporting Sample (about 1.1) (and insigni￿cant otherwise). The dummy for Sub-Saharan
Africa is sometimes signi￿cantly positive in all samples (Full Sample: 0.7; Non-Exporting
Sample: 1.2; OCAM Sample: 0.9; 1980 regression: 1.0). Otherwise it is insigni￿cant. The
O t h e rA s i a nd u m m yi sa l w a y ss i g n i ￿cantly negative in the Full Sample (between -0.7 and
-0.8) and in 1975 (-1.4) and insigni￿cant in all other samples and periods. The Eastern Euro-
pean dummy tends to be signi￿cantly negative (-0.7 to -0.9) or insigni￿cant when included.
The Arab dummy tends to be signi￿cantly negative (between -0.7 and -0.8 in Full Sample,
OCAM Sample, 1985 and 1990), or insigni￿cant.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
We have presented a case study of the diﬀusion of computers across countries. One of the
most robust ￿ndings is that high levels of educational attainment are important determinants
9of computer-technology adoption, even after controlling for a variety of other macroeconomic
variables, including per-capita income. Human capital is important in the Full Sample, the
Non-Exporting Sample, and the OCAM Sample. The eﬀect is quantitatively substantial: in
the full-sample and in the OCAM Sample a one-percentage-point increase in the fraction of
the labor force who have better than primary education leads to an increase in computer
investment per worker of roughly 1%. In the Non-Exporting Sample the response can be as
large as 5%.
The ￿nding of a robust and strong role for human capital in determining computer-
technology adoption constitutes new con￿rmatory evidence that recent technological devel-
opments have had a skill-biased component. The presumption of a skill bias in information
technology adoption is at the center of several attempts to explain recent wage dynamics
in the US and in several other countries.12 T h e r ee x i s t ss o m ec o u n t r y - s p e c i ￿c evidence of
computer-skill complementarity in the USA, but in this paper we have shown that the comple-
mentarity is a world-wide phenomenon.13 Unfortunately, this being a case study, we cannot
say whether the key role played by human capital is speci￿c to computers, or it extends to
any new technology.14,15
Another very robust result is that computer investment responds positively to a coun-
try￿s openness to manufacturing imports from the OECD. In the Full Sample, a 10% increase
in manufacturing imports per worker from the OECD leads to a roughly 6% increase in com-
12See, e.g., Alan Krueger (1993), David Autor, Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger (1998) Daron Acemoglu
(1998), Francesco Caselli (1999), Oded Galor and Daniel Tsiddon (1997), and Jeremy Greenwood and Mehmet
Yorukoglu (1997). Mark Doms, Timothy Dunne, and Kenneth Troske (1997) show that manufacturing plants
with relatively high skill intensity are more likely to adopt computers.
13See also Eli Berman, John Bound, and Stephen Machin (1998) for cross-country evidence of skill-biased
technological change.
14In the literature one can ￿nd two views of the relationship between skills and technology. One view
emphasizes ￿skill in adoption,￿ and holds that an educated ￿ and hence ￿exible ￿ workforce is always a critical
factor in the adoption of new technology. Another view focuses on ￿skill in use,￿ and argues that certain
technologies are inherently skill biased, i.e. complementary with educated workers. If the ￿rst view is correct,
then adoption of any new technology depends on human capital; if the latter is correct, only adoption of
skill-biased technologies depends on human capital. Furthermore, in the ￿rst view the role of human capital
becomes less important over time, while in the second it remains important throughout. By performing more
case studies of new technology diﬀusion, on data with improved time series comparability, it might be possible
to exploit the above mentioned diferences in predictions to asess the relative importance of the two views.
15An alternative interpretation is that the complementarity between human capital and computers is in
consumption (educated people derive utility from computers) rather than in production. As a partial check
on this hypothesis we have re-run some of our speci￿c a t i o n sw i t ha ni n t e r a c t i o nt e r mb e t w e e nt h es h a r eo f
agriculture and the share of skilled labor. The coeﬃcient is signi￿cantly negative. Hence, human capital is
less conducive to computer adoption in countries with a relatively large share of agriculture. It seems to us
that this supports a production over a consumption interpretation of the complementarity between human
capital and computers.
10puter investment per worker (10% in the Non-Exporting Sample, 4% in the OCAM Sample).
The interpretation of this ￿nding that is most consistent with the existing literature is that
countries that import manufactures from the OECD bene￿t from a knowledge spillover. As
people and products from the manufacturing industries of technologically advanced countries
are the most likely to possess or re￿ect knowledge of computers, their uses and operations,
exposure to such people and products allows other countries to learn about, and hence adopt,
the new technology.16 We should stress that imports of computers are always and everywhere
a minuscule fraction of overall manufacturing imports from the OECD. Hence, it is emphati-
cally not the case that the signi￿cance of manufacturing imports from the OECD is driven by
computers being a component of such imports. The fact that in the Non-Exporting Sample
imports of manufactures originating outside of the OECD are associated (albeit weakly) with
lower propensities to invest in computers remains somewhat of a puzzle.
In the Full Sample and in the OCAM Sample there is some evidence (at the 10% level)
of an eﬀect from openness in the other direction, namely exports. One possible rationale for
a role from exports is that traded goods, especially when directed to OECD countries, must
satisfy standards of uniform quality, packaging, disclosure, and barcoding that can only be
met through the application of computer technology. If this was the case, however, we would
expect exports of manufacturing to OECD countries to explain most of the action as far as
export variables are concerned. This variable is indeed signi￿cant at the 10% level in one
instance, but so is exports of non-manufacturing goods to non-OECD countries. Overall, we
think the export results are rather weak. The fact that the only trade-related variable that
reliably predicts computer adoption is manufacturing imports from the OECD reinforces a
knowledge-spillover interpretation.
Both in the Full Sample and in the Non-Exporting Sample computer adoption is
strongly associated with high overall investment rates ￿ for example because of high saving
rates. In the Full Sample, a 10% increase in investment per worker leads to an increase in
computer investment per worker in the 2 to 3% range. In the Non-Exporting Sample the
estimates are in the 6-to-9% range. This result is perhaps not surprising, but it reminds us
of an important lesson: when new technology is embodied in capital, high investment rates
are a pre-condition to technology adoption.17
Both in the Full Sample and in the OCAM Sample we ￿nd that a large share of
16For models of trade and technology diﬀusion see, e.g., Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991),
Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt (1998). Also, see the
related empirical work in David Coe and Helpman (1995), and Coe, Helpman, and Alexander Hoﬀmeister
(1997).
17The literature on embodied technological progress is huge. Among recent contributions are Jeremy Green-
wood, Zvi Hercowitz, and Per Krusell (1997), and Boyan Jovanovic and Rafael Rob (1998).
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one-percentage-point increase in the share of agriculture leads to a 2-to-3 percent decline
in computer investment per worker (6 to 8% in the OCAM Sample). Unfortunately, the
two samples disagree strongly on the question that is perhaps more interesting, i.e., whether
there are diﬀerential eﬀects on the relative shares of manufacturing and services: no in the
Full Sample, yes in the OCAM Sample, where manufacturing appears to be more computer-
friendly than services. The full-sample result is consistent with the view that computers
are a general purpose technology, with a broad scope of applicability both in manufacturing
and services.18 The OCAM result points to more sector-speci￿city ￿ at least at this level of
aggregation ￿ with a bias towards manufacturing.
In several speci￿cations for the Non-Exporting Sample and especially for the OCAM
Sample we ￿n dar o l ef o rt h ed e g r e eo fp r o p e r t yr i g h t sp r o t e c t i o n .T h i se ﬀect is not robust
in speci￿cations that include export variables, which suggests an interpretation in terms of
omitted-variable bias. However, we also note that the Non-Exporting and OCAM Sample
sizes are quite small, so that another interpretation could be that we have overstretched the
degrees of freedom by including the export variables (which are almost never signi￿cant in
these samples anyway). Because of this ambiguity, we do not dismiss the property-right
result. When signi￿cant, the eﬀect of property rights protection is large. The index is on
as c a l ef r o m0t o10 and a unit increase would lead to an increase in computer investment
per worker in excess of 10% (in the OCAM Sample). To make this more concrete, moving
from the ￿rst quartile to the median of the distribution of the property rights index requires
a 2-point increase. It would be easy to rationalize a role for property rights in embodied
technology adoption. Computers, for example, are relatively easy to con￿scate, steal, or loot.
Interestingly, however, the results suggest that property rights protection is important even
after controlling for general investment. This might indicate that property rights protection
has an impact on the composition of investment over and above its impact on the general
level of investment.
Subject to the same caveats about the role of export variables, in the OCAM Sample
we also ￿nd a strong negative eﬀect on computer adoption from a large government share in
GDP. A one-percentage-point increase in government spending as a share of GDP is associated
with an increase in computer investment per worker of 2-to-3 percent. The result that large
governments are bad for technology adoption would make a lot of sense: public bureaucracies
are notoriously conservative and generally lack the incentives to seize new eﬃciency-enhancing
opportunities. A country in which a larger share of economic activity is dominated by this
inertia will be slower at embracing new technologies.
18See Helpman (1998) for a collection of contributions on GPTs.
12In none of the three samples there is any evidence that particular foreign language
skills are important determinants of technology adoption.
In terms of regional adoption performance a surprising result is that the Sub-Saharan
Africa dummy is often signi￿cantly positive. Hence, relative to the OECD, Sub-Saharan
Africa tends to adopt computers to an extent that is greater than what would be predicted
by its human capital, outward openness, investment rate, etc. All the other regional dummies
tend to have negative coeﬃcients (when signi￿cant), and are therefore conditional underper-
formers ￿ vis-a-vis the OECD ￿ without a clear ranking among themselves.
In including per-capita income in our regressions we did not have in mind any speci￿c
causal mechanism. Rather, we thought of it as a (admittedly rudimentary) control for other
possible determinants of technology adoption that data limitations (or limitations of imagi-
nation) prevented us from including. From this perspective, a fully successful case study of
technology adoption should lead to speci￿cations in which per-capita income is not statisti-
cally signi￿cant, as its continued signi￿cance signals that those additional determinants for
whom per-capita income is a stand-in have not been fully identi￿ed. Since per-capita income
has some (if weak) signi￿cant predictive power in our full sample, our list of determinants of
computer adoption is conceivably still incomplete.
Besides identifying additional determinants, future work will have to answer several
questions left open by the present contribution. Is the complementarity between computer
adoption and human capital a sign of a long-run technical complementarity, or is it driven
by the fact that skills are especially useful during the early stages of a technological change?
What exactly is the role of property rights in technology adoption? Are large governments
bad for technology adoption? Also, we have been unable to seek evidence on the role for
learning externalities in computer adoption.19 We believe that additional case studies of
other episodes of international technology diﬀusion along the lines of the present work could
be invaluable in starting to answering these questions.
19Austan Goolsbee and Peter Klenow (2000) p[resent evidence of network eﬀects in the diﬀusion of home
computers in the United States.
13Appendix 1: data sources and deﬁnitions
For the dependent variables see the text.
Log Income Per Worker. PPP, from Robert Summers and Alan Heston (1994).
Log Investment Per Worker. PPP, from Summers and Heston (1994).
Agriculture Share in GDP. From World Bank (1999).
Manufacturing Share in GDP. From World Bank (1999).
Governemnt Spending Share of GDP. F r o mS u m m e r sa n dH e s t o n( 1994).
Property Rights. This index is constructed by researchers at the Fraser Institute,
(Jim Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and Dexter Samida, 2000), mainly using data from the
International Country Risk Guide of the PRS Group. The index purports to provide an
internationally comparable measure of the overall security of property rights and the qual-
ity of the legal structure. It takes values from 1 (least protection) to 10( g r e a t e s tp r o -
tection). It is one of a broader set of measures of economic freedom developed by these
authors. The property right index is itself an aggregate of three more speci￿cm e a s u r e s
of property rights and legal structure. The data (and the book) can be dowloaded at
http://www.freetheworld.com/download.html. File V.xls reports the three sub-categories
(A, B, and C) as well as the aggregate measure (V).
Fraction who Speak English. From Robert Hall and Charles Jones (1999).
Human Capital. Fraction of the labor force over 15 years of age that has completed
primary school. From Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (1993).
Primary Education, Secondary Education, Higher Education. Fractions of the labor
force over 15 years of age who have some primary education but no secondary education,
some secondary but not higher education, and some higher education, respectively. From
Barro and Lee (1993).
Imports and Exports data. Obtained by summation over the relevant countries and
categories from Feenstra, Lipsey, and Bowen (1997).
Appendix 2: country-year coverage of the three samples
See Table A.1.
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16Table 2: Full Sample
I II III IV V
Log Income Per-Worker 0.334* 0.341* 0.333* 0.219 0.119
(0.197) (0.199) (0.190) (0.197) (0.198)
Log Investment Per-Worker 0.333** 0.322** 0.259** 0.251** 0.235*
(0.124) (0.125) (0.123) (0.121) (0.124)
Agriculture Share in GDP -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.022***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Manufacturing Share in GDP 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Gov. Spending Share in GDP -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Property Rights (1-10) 0.043 0.044 0.035 0.036 0.032
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Fraction who Speak English -0.042 -0.047 -0.079 -0.106 -0.089
(0.223) (0.224) (0.214) (0.208) (0.217)
Human Capital 0.012** 0.012** 0.011** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)








Log MNF. Imp. from OECD PW 0.588*** 0.550*** 0.583***
(0.129) (0.129) (0.132)
Log Non-MNF Imp. from OECD PW 0.079 0.020 0.006
(0.131) (0.133) (0.130)
Log MNF Imp. From Non-OECD PW -0.033 -0.049 -0.072
(0.076) (0.076) (0.080)
Log Non-MNF Imp. from Non-OECD PW -0.078 -0.080 -0.131*
(0.070) (0.069) (0.072)
Log Exports Per-Worker 0.180*
(0.101)
Log MNF Exp. to OECD PW 0.088*
(0.045)
Log Non-MNF Exp. to OECD PW 0.031
(0.072)
Log MNF Exp. to Non-OECD PW 0.066
(0.054)
Log Non-MNF Exp. to Non-OECD PW 0.124*
(0.064)
R
2 0.947 0.947 0.951 0.952 0.954
N u m b e r o f C o u n t r i e s 8 98 98 98 98 9
Number of Observations 337 337 337 337 337
Note. Dependent Variable is the log of computer imports per worker in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. Year
dummies and a set of regional dummies were included in each regression. Estimation technique is Random
Eﬀect (RE). Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical signi￿cance is denoted by * (10%), ** (5%), or ***(1%).
MNF stands for ￿Manufacturing,￿ and PW stands for ￿Per-Worker￿.
17Table 3: Non-Exporting Sample
I II III IV V
Log Income Per-Worker -0.342 -0.314 -0.467 -0.512 -0.722
(0.447) (0.456) (0.444) (0.492) (0.504)
Log Investment Per-Worker 0.859*** 0.890*** 0.666** 0.669** 0.925**
(0.301) (0.312) (0.299) (0.302) (0.341)
Agriculture Share in GDP -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.015 -0.007
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Manufacturing Share in GDP -0.023 -0.020 -0.009 -0.010 -0.023
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
Gov. Spending Share in GDP 0.006 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Property Rights (1-10) 0.207** 0.203** 0.138 0.138 0.141
(0.092) (0.093) (0.090) (0.090) (0.094)
Fraction who Speak English 0.344 0.221 0.040 0.033 0.367
(1.123) (1.226) (1.134) (1.144) (1.178)
Human Capital 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.041*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)








Log MNF. Imp. from OECD PW 0.956*** 0.948** 0.876**
(0.347) (0.353) (0.370)
Log Non-MNF Imp. from OECD PW -0.366 -0.379 -0.325
(0.384) (0.391) (0.420)
Log MNF Imp. From Non-OECD PW -0.360* -0.353* -0.212
(0.199) (0.203) (0.224)
Log Non-MNF Imp. from Non-OECD PW -0.155 -0.162 -0.202
(0.183) (0.187) (0.199)
Log Exports Per-Worker 0.052
(0.228)
Log MNF Exp. to OECD PW 0.186
(0.112)
Log Non-MNF Exp. to OECD PW -0.021
(0.187)
Log MNF Exp. to Non-OECD PW -0.066
(0.140)
Log Non-MNF Exp. to Non-OECD PW -0.026
(0.157)
R
2 0.887 0.889 0.905 0.906 0.910
N u m b e r o f C o u n t r i e s 4 44 44 44 4 4 4
Number of Observations 87 87 87 87 87
Note. Dependent Variable is the log of computer imports per worker in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990. Year
dummies and a set of regional dummies were included in each regression. Estimation technique is Random
Eﬀect (RE). Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical signi￿cance is denoted by * (10%), ** (5%), or ***(1%).
MNF stands for ￿Manufacturing,￿ and PW stands for ￿Per-Worker￿.
18Table 4: OCAM Sample
I II III IV V
Log Income Per-Worker -0.185 -0.207 -0.075 -0.335 -0.302
(0.329) (0.307) (0.358) (0.397) (0.427)
Log Investment Per-Worker 0.118 0.086 -0.038 -0.176 -0.104
(0.192) (0.184) (0.238) (0.249) (0.262)
Agriculture Share in GDP -0.070*** -0.065*** -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.082***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
Manufacturing Share in GDP 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.052***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Gov. Spending Share in GDP -0.022* -0.028** -0.023* -0.017 -0.020
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Property Rights (1-10) 0.131** 0.169*** 0.122** 0.080 0.088
(0.056) (0.055) (0.059) (0.061) (0.065)
Fraction who Speak English 0.165 0.103 -0.035 0.063 0.020
(0.265) (0.250) (0.299) (0.310) (0.344)
Human Capital 0.013** 0.012** 0.015** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)








Log MNF. Imp. from OECD PW 0.425* 0.561** 0.418*
(0.220) (0.232) (0.237)
Log Non-MNF Imp. from OECD PW -0.052 -0.299 -0.179
(0.246) (0.283) (0.280)
Log MNF Imp. From Non-OECD PW 0.159 0.052 0.134
(0.142) (0.153) (0.161)
Log Non-MNF Imp. from Non-OECD PW 0.038 0.072 0.106
(0.140) (0.143) (0.187)
Log Exports Per-Worker 0.356*
(0.196)
Log MNF Exp. to OECD PW 0.095
(0.109)
Log Non-MNF Exp. to OECD PW 0.153
(0.161)
Log MNF Exp. to Non-OECD PW -0.015
(0.133)
Log Non-MNF Exp. to Non-OECD PW 0.018
(0.159)
R
2 0.965 0.968 0.966 0.968 0.968
N u m b e r o f C o u n t r i e s 4 54 54 54 54 5
Number of Observations 72 72 72 72 72
Note. Dependent Variable is the log of OCAM adoption (production plus net imports) per worker in 1985 and
1990. Year dummies and a set of regional dummies were included in each regression. Estimation technique is
Random Eﬀect (RE). Standard errors in parenthesis. Statistical signi￿cance is denoted by * (10%), ** (5%),
or ***(1%). MNF stands for ￿Manufacturing,￿ and PW stands for ￿Per-Worker￿.
19Table 5: Regressions by year
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Log Income Per-Worker 0.972 -0.541 0.459 0.629** 0.150
(0.783) (0.772) (0.409) (0.269) (0.191)
Log Investment Per-Worker -0.033 0.488 0.260 0.071 0.032
(0.702) (0.514) (0.247) (0.176) (0.133)
Agriculture Share in GDP -0.070*** -0.051*** -0.026** -0.023** -0.018**
(0.022) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)
Manufacturing Share in GDP -0.002 0.008 0.004 0.007 0.012*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.007)
Gov. Spending Share in GDP 0.015 -0.021 -0.018 -0.010 -0.018*
(0.028) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) (0.009)
Property Rights (1-10) -0.084 0.050 0.138* 0.173*** 0.041
(0.111) (0.088) (0.070) (0.053) (0.043)
Fraction who Speak English -0.357 -0.111 -0.303 -0.077 0.142
(0.589) (0.536) (0.356) (0.286) (0.206)
Human Capital 0.013 0.015 0.014* 0.011 0.001
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005)
Log Manuf. Imports from OECD Per-Worker 0.251 0.514** 0.811*** 0.678*** 0.750***
(0.253) (0.238) (0.189) (0.127) (0.100)
Log Manuf. Imports from Non-OECD Per-Worker 0.061 0.044 -0.253* -0.180* 0.119
(0.191) (0.189) (0.135) (0.101) (0.079)
R
2 0.898 0.905 0.925 0.933 0.966
N u m b e r o f C o u n t r i e s 4 3 4 57 78 98 3
Note. Dependent Variable is the log of computer imports per worker. A set of regional dummies was included
in each regression. Estimation technique is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Standard errors in parenthesis.
Statistical signi￿cance is denoted by * (10%), ** (5%), or ***(1%). MNF stands for ￿Manufacturing,￿ and
PW stands for ￿Per-Worker￿.
20Table A.1: The Samples
Name World Bank Regional Computer Imports per Worker in Years in Years in
Code Dummy 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 NES OCAM S.
Algeria DZA Arab World 0.61 1.40 9.77 6.48 10.00 3 0
Bahrain BHR Arab World 80.65 0 0
Egypt EGY Arab World 0.09 0.84 1.45 2.71 3 2
Iran IRN Arab World 0.35 0.98 0.70 2.95 1 1
Jordan JOR Arab World 0.99 12.24 1 1
Kuwait KWT Arab World 36.24 67.88 0 1
Syria SYR Arab World 2.12 1.11 1.22 3 0
Tunisia TUN Arab World 0.17 0.70 1.60 2.76 16.55 1 0
Hong Kong HKG East Asia 0.39 2.77 19.94 105.29 292.15 0 2
Indonesia IDN East Asia 0.01 0.09 0.28 1.08 2.20 1 1
Malaysia MYS East Asia 0.20 0.66 3.64 17.70 31.72 0 2
Papua N. G. PNG East Asia 2.98 2.54 0 0
Philippines PHL East Asia 0.11 0.38 1.15 1.07 2.72 2 2
S. Korea KOR East Asia 0.03 0.53 5.82 16.77 55.58 0 2
Singapore SGP East Asia 2.05 7.24 52.38 211.18 1132.62 0 2
Thailand THA East Asia 0.04 0.14 0.32 2.35 6.45 0 1
Bulgaria BGR East Europe 4.37 5.22 0 0
Hungary HUN East Europe 6.06 24.56 0 0
Poland POL East Europe 2.53 6.34 0 0
Argentina ARG Lat. Am. 0.90 1.18 15.23 9.92 9.11 0 0
Barbados BRB Lat. Am. 26.50 0 0
Bolivia BOL Lat. Am. 0.39 1.65 2.47 3 0
Brazil BRA Lat. Am. 0.23 1.82 1.79 2.99 3.38 0 0
Chile CHL Lat. Am. 1.17 4.68 8.46 11.43 19.31 2 1
Colombia COL Lat. Am. 0.17 0.68 3.12 4.37 8.55 4 2
Costa Rica CRI Lat. Am. 1.42 1.67 22.75 3 0
Dom. Rep. DOM Lat. Am. 2.11 1.85 4.77 1 0
Ecuador ECU Lat. Am. 0.02 1.31 5.08 5.19 4.90 5 2
El Salvador SLV Lat. Am. 0.09 0.30 1.99 2 0
Guatemala GTM Lat. Am. 0.43 0.43 4.73 2 1
Guyana GUY Lat. Am. 0.61 0.30 3.21 0 0
Haiti HTI Lat. Am. 0.26 0.84 0 0
Honduras HND Lat. Am. 0.55 0.77 3.51 2 2
Jamaica JAM Lat. Am. 1.08 6.24 8.89 1 0
Mexico MEX Lat. Am. 0.45 1.23 6.48 7.20 15.55 1 1
Nicaragua NIC Lat. Am. 0.01 0.44 1.89 3 1
Panama PAN Lat. Am. 1.63 11.78 13.85 2 2
Paraguay PRY Lat. Am. 3.51 1.77 29.69 2 0
Peru PER Lat. Am. 0.27 1.23 2.50 4.61 4.05 2 2
Trin. and Tob. TTO Lat. Am. 13.64 23.59 14.71 0 1
Uruguay URY Lat. Am. 6.45 5.10 12.99 1 1
Venezuela VEN Lat. Am. 0.17 5.26 12.64 28.68 17.32 2 2
Note. In full sample a country-year data point is included when table entry is not missing. Dependent variable
is log of table entry. Last two columns give the number of years in which the country was included in the
Non-Exporting Sample (NES) and in the OCAM Sample, respectively. Table continues on next page.
21Table A.1: The Samples (continued)
Name World Bank Regional Computer Imports per Worker in Years in Years in
Code Dummy 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 NES OCAM S.
Bangladesh BGD Other Asia 0.01 0.09 0.10 3 2
China CHN Other Asia 0.90 0.63 0 0
India IND Other Asia 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.33 0 2
Pakistan PAK Other Asia 0.04 0.02 0.12 0.41 1.08 1 1
Sri Lanka LKA Other Asia 0.30 0.97 1.49 1 1
Benin BEN Sub-Sahara 0.32 0.40 0.87 2 0
Cameroon CMR Sub-Sahara 1.33 1.95 1.93 0 0
Centr. Afr. Rep. CAF Sub-Sahara 0.10 0.10 1.13 2 0
Congo COG Sub-Sahara 1.63 3.96 5.93 2 0
Ghana GHA Sub-Sahara 0.14 0.39 0.79 1 1
Kenya KEN Sub-Sahara 0.05 0.18 0.35 0.76 0.95 2 0
Malawi MWI Sub-Sahara 0.12 0.57 0.44 0 0
Mali MLI Sub-Sahara 0.03 0.26 0.69 2 0
Mauritius MUS Sub-Sahara 1.79 22.57 1 0
Niger NER Sub-Sahara 0.35 0.26 2 0
Senegal SEN Sub-Sahara 0.97 1.40 4.52 0 1
Sierra Leone SLE Sub-Sahara 0.28 0.50 1 0
South Africa ZAF Sub-Sahara 1.63 6.52 25.76 25.07 20.57 0 1
Togo TGO Sub-Sahara 0.55 0.66 2.52 3 0
Uganda UGA Sub-Sahara 0.03 0.11 0.29 1 0
Zambia ZMB Sub-Sahara 0.67 2.45 2.19 0 0
Zimbabwe ZWE Sub-Sahara 0.24 1.62 3.74 1 0
Australia AUS none 4.18 15.46 53.82 122.49 200.35 0 2
Austria AUT none 63.14 82.42 236.46 0 0
Belgium BEL none 7.71 29.49 100.67 142.72 363.33 0 0
Canada CAN none 4.59 24.29 56.48 119.22 275.93 0 2
Cyprus CYP none 18.98 69.98 0 0
Denmark DNK none 6.62 22.85 78.28 122.03 261.03 0 1
Finland FIN none 2.08 19.55 56.62 95.57 209.96 0 2
France FRA none 4.60 15.51 59.53 84.89 198.79 0 0
Greece GRC none 0.60 0.87 6.08 12.18 42.62 2 2
Iceland ISL none 0.19 3.30 25.11 129.28 149.22 4 3
Ireland IRL none 1.38 7.86 95.82 277.62 451.44 0 0
Israel ISR none 4.08 1.19 57.62 144.15 158.77 1 0
Italy ITA none 2.26 9.68 38.27 58.74 150.83 0 1
Japan JPN none 0.51 3.19 11.28 16.29 44.86 0 2
Malta MLT none 18.26 0 0
Netherlands NLD none 8.29 29.15 117.22 210.69 689.84 0 2
New Zealand NZL none 3.20 17.18 41.30 109.71 160.85 0 0
Norway NOR none 1.70 16.75 79.89 174.98 263.80 0 2
Portugal PRT none 0.95 1.35 8.99 14.41 82.05 0 2
Spain ESP none 1.89 10.11 25.33 41.08 134.91 0 2
Sweden SWE none 3.14 24.61 85.81 144.08 290.21 0 2
Switzerland CHE none 5.37 25.67 126.22 202.68 563.57 0 0
Turkey TUR none 0.02 0.20 0.22 2.56 11.36 2 2
UK GBR none 2.28 10.66 60.20 117.84 257.67 0 2
USA USA none 1.12 1.88 8.33 55.07 126.56 0 2
22Table A.2: Univariate Regressions
Variable Coeﬃcient t-statistic
Log Income Per-Worker 1.991 42.878
Log Investment Per-Worker 1.244 40.140
Agriculture Share in GDP -0.119 -34.734
Manufacturing Share in GDP 0.059 8.649
Gov. Spending Share in GDP -0.076 -10.234
Property Rights (1-10) 0.639 19.596
Fraction who Speak English 2.638 7.235
Human Capital 0.083 19.268
Log Imports Per-Worker 1.405 57.617
Primary Education 0.031 5.449
Secondary Education 0.102 16.523
Higher Education 0.192 15.256
Log MNF. Imp. from OECD PW 1.322 56.306
Log Non-MNF Imp. from OECD PW 1.408 58.638
Log MNF Imp. From Non-OECD PW 1.233 45.375
Log Non-MNF Imp. from Non-OECD PW 1.131 43.125
Log Exports Per-Worker 1.280 54.640
Log MNF Exp. to OECD PW 0.824 50.287
Log Non-MNF Exp. to OECD PW 1.034 40.789
Log MNF Exp. to Non-OECD PW 0.749 42.024
Log Non-MNF Exp. to Non-OECD PW 1.023 39.386
East Asia 0.644 1.745
Lat. Am. 0.280 1.142
Sub-Sahara -2.458 -12.273
Other Asia -3.652 -9.064
East Europe 0.607 1.208
Arab World -0.061 -0.204
Note. Dependent Variable is the log of computer imports per worker. Year dummies were included in each
regression. Estimation technique is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). MNF stands for ￿Manufacturing,￿ and
PW stands for ￿Per-Worker￿.
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